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Wage Subsidies as a Tool to  
Fight Recessions 
by Hoon Hian Teck1 
 
“First, we need to reduce our business costs, to help viable companies tide over the crisis and minimise 
unemployment.  The significant currency re-alignments have affected our cost competitiveness.  We should 
take prompt measures to reduce business costs directly, including wage costs, to restore our position.” 
 
         — Committee on Singapore’s Competitiveness, November 1998 
Introduction 
Since 1981, MAS has used the exchange rate as 
the primary tool of macroeconomic stabilisation. 
As discussed in another Special Feature by Ilian 
Mihov in the April 2013 issue of the Review, an 
exchange rate-based policy rule not only 
describes very well Singapore’s actual conduct of 
monetary policy but it has also delivered reduced 
volatility in inflation and output.2  Yet, as the 
quotation above suggests, during the onslaught of 
the contagion effects arising from the 1997–98 
Asian Financial Crisis when Singapore’s export 
demand declined precipitously, threatening a rise 
in the unemployment rate, exchange rate 
adjustment did not act alone to counteract the 
decline in aggregate demand (AD).  Instead, the 
committee set up by then-Prime Minister Goh 
Chok Tong recommended a big reduction in wage 
costs as an additional tool to fight the recession. 
Indeed, in two other major recessionary episodes  
 
 that hit post-independence Singapore—the 
1985–86 recession and the fallout from the 
2008–09 Global Financial Crisis—reducing wage 
costs was a major policy tool to stabilise the 
economy. 
 
The policy Singapore adopted in response to a 
significant decline in AD, namely, implementing a 
national programme of lowering wage costs, is 
somewhat uncommon—both among emerging 
and developed economies.  Suppose an economy 
is hit by a recessionary shock that causes a fall in 
AD.3  Economies that follow a conventional Taylor 
rule would progressively lower the short-term 
nominal interest rate to spur AD, both by 
effectively lowering the real interest rate and by 
weakening domestic currencies as international 
capital flows out (under a flexible exchange rate 
regime).  Conventional fiscal policy takes the 
 
 
                                                          
1
  Hoon Hian Teck is Professor of Economics and Associate Dean at the School of Economics, Singapore Management 
University.  The views in this Special Feature are solely those of the author and should not be attributed to MAS. 
 
2
  Professor Mihov used quarterly data for Singapore from Q1 1981 to Q4 2012 to estimate the policy rule, or the central 
bank’s reaction function, by relating the change in the exchange rate to deviations of the inflation rate from an implicit 
inflation target and the size of the output gap, which refers to the deviation of actual GDP from potential GDP.  Relative to 
a conventional Taylor rule, the volatility of inflation and output was found to be only a fifth as large.  
 
3
  I mean by a fall in AD a leftward shift of the whole AD schedule in the conventional price-output plane.  
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form of boosting AD either directly, by increasing 
government purchases or indirectly, by a cut in 
income taxes.4  It is not often the case that a 
programme to directly reduce wage costs would 
be a centrepiece of a national economic recovery 
effort.  
 
The question then arises: how does the use of 
wage subsidies—the term for lowering wage costs 
through policy intervention—fit into the corpus of 
macroeconomic theory? 5   In particular, since  
the seminal work on micro-foundations for 
macroeconomics, summarised in the Phelps et al. 
(1970) volume, the Phillips curve relationship or 
aggregate supply (AS) curve is derived from the  
 
 optimising decisions of all economic agents—both 
producers and employees.  How does the 
introduction of a wage subsidy scheme during a 
recession affect the decision of firms with regard 
to hiring and the decision of employees with 
regard to quitting?  How does the producer adjust 
its mark-up in response to the implementation of 
a wage subsidy scheme?  In this Special Feature, I 
first study the theoretical results of implementing 
a wage subsidy scheme in a model economy 
featuring both labour turnover (or quitting) and 
variable mark-ups.6  Then, I present a case study 
of Singapore’s experience with using wage 
subsidies to fight recessions by taking a 
preliminary look at relevant data. 
Effects of a Wage Subsidy in the Model Economy 
There are two main features of the model 
economy I would like to use to analyse the 
theoretical effects of introducing a wage subsidy 
scheme to fight recessions: dispersed information 
and the absence of a “Walrasian” auctioneer.  
Without a fictitious Walrasian auctioneer to call 
out prices to clear markets instantaneously, each 
firm must adopt a wage policy (to combat 
quitting) and a product pricing policy.  The result 
is that job rationing—hence involuntary 
unemployment—emerges and price-marginal cost 
mark-ups vary as firms exercise their market 
power.  As information is dispersed, no single 
economic actor initially knows what the 
 
 others in the economy know.  Yet, in setting 
wages and product prices, each firm does not 
want to be caught paying its employees too little 
(for fear of precipitating labour turnover) or 
charging its customers too much (for fear of 
losing market share).  The consequence of the 
dispersed information, also called incomplete 
information, is that each firm often gets its 
expectations of wages and prices prevailing 
elsewhere in the economy wrong—a state of 
expectational disequilibrium.  So long as the 
economy is in such a state, the actual 
unemployment rate will deviate from the natural 
rate of unemployment. 
 
                                                          
4
  By increasing disposable income, households, particularly those that are liquidity-constrained, are encouraged to increase 
their expenditure.  Fiscal policy might also take the form of investment tax credits, which stimulate investment spending.  
All these tax measures have the feature that they are aimed at boosting AD, that is, at shifting the AD schedule to the right. 
 
5
  Terms synonymous with wage subsidies include employment subsidies and jobs credits.  A wage subsidy lowers the 
marginal cost of employing a worker.  In the scheme studied in this Special Feature, the reduction in, say, hourly wage 
cost is applied to all employees on the firm’s payroll. 
 
6
  The analysis here builds upon work reported in Hoon and Phelps (1992, 2003, 2008).  All these papers focus on the effects 
of shocks and policy changes on the natural rate of unemployment, that is, the rate of unemployment that prevails when 
the economy is producing at its potential output level.  With the objective of understanding the effects of a wage subsidy 
scheme on the output gap, I introduce to the “natural rate” model of the aforementioned papers those features that can 
cause the actual unemployment rate to deviate, at least temporarily, from the natural rate of unemployment.   
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There is a certain rhythm in the model economy 
with regard to when wages are set and pricing 
decisions are made.  Wages are typically set a 
year before any new pay adjustment occurs. 
Product prices may be adjusted more often than 
once a year but typically not on a daily basis.7 
Moreover, the dates for wage and price setting 
occur throughout the year in a non-synchronous 
manner.  The result of the staggering of wage and 
price setting throughout the year is that, even 
when information flow has become reasonably 
complete, the economy exhibits some form of 
nominal wage and price stickiness.  In response, 
say, to a negative AD shock, average wages and 
prices do not immediately fall by enough to 
restore the economy to its potential output level. 
Wage and price staggering, therefore, imparts to 
the economy persistence in the output gap; 
hence, a recession can become a long-drawn 
affair in the absence of any policy intervention.   
 
It is now helpful to go through some preliminary 
steps to derive the AS schedule in the model 
economy since a wage subsidy effectively works 
through a shift in the AS curve.  A representative 
firm has to make three decisions: set a wage to 
minimise labour turnover; determine the level of 
employment; and choose the optimal mark-up of 
price over marginal cost.  Choosing the optimal 
wage leads to an equation that makes the firm’s 
real supply wage,        , an increasing 
function of the wage expected to be paid 
elsewhere in the economy relative to the firm’s 
own wage,         , as well as the 
employment rate,      .  Determining the 
profit-maximising level of employment leads to an 
equation that makes the firm’s real demand 
wage,        , a decreasing function of 
        ,      , the real interest rate,  , and 
gross mark-up, , and an increasing function of 
the wage subsidy expressed in real terms,   . 
Essentially, in the familiar real wage-employment 
rate plane, the real supply wage schedule is 
upward-sloping and is shifted up by an increase  
in the wage expected elsewhere relative  
to the firm’s own wage.  The real demand  
wage schedule, on the other hand, is   
 downward-sloping; it is shifted down by an 
increase in the real interest rate and the gross 
mark-up, but is shifted up by an increase in the 
wage subsidy. 
 
The real supply wage schedule, or wage curve, 
takes the place of an upward-sloping labour 
supply curve in neoclassical analysis—it gives the 
firm’s optimal incentive wage required to 
minimise total costs at any given employment 
rate, after taking into account the problem of 
labour turnover.  The real demand wage 
schedule or labour demand curve is 
downward-sloping because a tighter labour 
market leads to more rampant quitting.  As a 
result, each firm needs to devote more resources 
to providing firm-specific training for new hires 
(to replace those who quit), thus reducing the 
wage that it can then afford to pay its employees 
and still remain profitable. 
 
It remains to ask what determines the 
gross mark-up?  In the customer-market model 
originally introduced by Phelps and Winter 
(1970), the gross mark-up is an increasing 
function of the product price expected to be 
charged elsewhere in the economy relative to 
the firm’s own product price,       , and a 
decreasing function of the shadow value 
attached to an additional customer,  .8   The 
latter, in turn, is given by the present discounted 
value of the stream of monopoly profits derived 
from investing in an additional customer.  We 
express the gross mark-up as:           . 
 
Equating the real supply wage to the real 
demand wage, and noting that the real marginal 
cost       is the inverse of the mark-up, we 
can write: 
 


 
1
( ,1- , , )
( , )
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   (1) 
 
where the first expression is the equilibrium real 
wage divided by the marginal physical product of 
labour.  What equation (1) gives us is, in effect,  
 
 
 
                                                          
7
  See Klenow and Malin (2011) for a recent survey of the microeconomic evidence on price-setting and Taylor (1999) for 
evidence on wage-setting. 
 
8
  In the Phelps-Winter customer-market model, each customer is an asset to the firm. 
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an upward-sloping AS schedule in the 
price-employment rate plane.  Juxtaposing a 
downward-sloping AD schedule in the same plane 
determines   and         given      
         ,  ,  , and   . 
 
Suppose that the economy is initially producing at 
potential output and there is a fall in AD.  Due to 
dispersed information as well as nominal wage 
and price stickiness, the rate of unemployment 
rises above the natural rate of unemployment and 
the recession persists.  In this environment, an 
increase in the wage subsidy acts to shift the AS 
schedule to the right.  This is because the wage 
subsidy drives a wedge between the real demand 
wage and the real supply wage, on the one hand, 
and it also gives firms an incentive to reduce 
mark-ups, on the other hand.  We can call this 
channel through which the wage subsidy  
 
 operates a “boosting of labour demand” 
channel.   
 
Two other channels through which a wage 
subsidy scheme to fight recessions might 
minimise unemployment and boost employment 
are: (a) “cash-flow channel” and (b) “signalling 
channel”.  In the cash-flow channel, the provision 
of wage subsidies enables firms that are 
credit-constrained, but are otherwise healthy, to 
avoid going bust during the recession.  Hence, 
layoffs are avoided.  In the signalling channel, the 
policy-makers, who possess superior data, can 
signal that a shock is not industry- or 
sector-specific, but is in fact economy-wide in its 
impact.  By implementing a national wage 
subsidy scheme, they convey information to 
firms that help to narrow the expectational 
disequilibrium. 
Case Study of 1997–98 and 2008–09 Recessions 
Export demand for Singapore’s goods and services 
fell by 4.4% in 1998 compared to 1997, while GDP 
also contracted.  Likewise, export demand fell by 
close to 8% when the economy went into a 
recession in 2009.  Both these recessionary 
episodes can be attributed in large part to a fall in 
external demand.  In response, the government 
cut the Central Provident Fund (CPF) contribution 
rate for employers from 20% in 1998 to 10% in 
1999 and 12% in 2000.  In the latter episode, it 
implemented a Jobs Credit Scheme (JCS) in 
January 2009 that ran for a year and a half, which 
effectively lowered labour costs by about 12%, 
subject to a monthly wage cap of S$2,500 per 
worker. 
 
The lowering of wage costs through a cut in 
employers’ CPF contribution rates and the 
granting of jobs credits to firms should, as our 
theoretical analysis suggests, shift out the AS 
schedule along a given downward-sloping AD 
schedule.  Even at an unchanged exchange rate, 
the resulting lower unit labour cost (ULC) should 
raise international competitiveness and partially 
offset the initial fall in export demand.  This 
channel is likely to be more important in sectors 
with higher export shares.  Direct exports make 
 
 up over 60% of manufactured output, so wage 
subsidies would be relatively more important in 
boosting the manufacturing sector.  If the 
channels highlighted here are operative, we 
should also expect to see, with the introduction 
of wage subsidies, a boost to export demand 
coming from cheaper manufactured products. 
 
Chart 1 shows measures of Singapore’s 
international competitiveness from 1996–2013. 
We note that wage subsidies have the biggest 
effect on the ULC in the manufacturing sector, 
reducing the index from 100 in 1998 to 84.7 in 
1999 and 81.9 in 2000, and then reducing it from 
85.0 in 2008 to 81.4 in 2009 and 68.6 in 2010.9 
For the overall economy, the index went down 
from 105.7 in 1998 to 98.1 in 1999 and 100.1 in 
2000, and increased slightly from 105.2 in 2008 
to 106.0 in 2009 before declining to 102.5 in 
2010.   
 
The S$ nominal effective exchange rate (S$NEER) 
played a complementary role in boosting 
international competitiveness.  The Singapore 
dollar was allowed to weaken against the basket 
of currencies of its main trading partners, going 
from 103.7 in 1998 to 98.5 in 1999 and 98.7  
 
                                                          
9
  The index is set to 100 in 1996. 
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in 2000.  However, there was little change in the 
S$NEER from 2008 to 2009 and, in fact, it 
strengthened slightly from 2009 to 2010. 10 
Calculated based on the CPI, the S$ real effective 
exchange rate (S$REER) showed a decline from 
98.6 in 1998 to 92.0 in 1999 and 91.8 in 2000.  It 
stayed unchanged at 90.8 in 2008 and 2009 and 
actually increased to 93.9 in 2010.  However, it is 
noteworthy that the price index for Singapore’s 
manufactured products, which might be a better 
index to use than the CPI to reflect international 
competitiveness, shows a decline from 107.4 in 
2008 to 93.0 in 2009 and 94.6 in 2010.11 
 
Export demand grew by 7.8% in 1999 compared 
to 1998 and by 17.4% in 2010 compared to 2009. 
Real GDP also showed a strong rebound, growing 
at 6.1% in 1999 and 8.9% in 2000; it expanded by 
over 15% in 2010 after registering negative 
growth in 2009. 
 How well does the experience of the recoveries 
from the 1997–98 and 2008–09 recessions 
match the predictions of the theory described 
above?  The initial shock causing a decline in 
export demand was mainly a fall in income in 
Singapore’s trading partners—mainly Asia during 
the 1997–98 recession and the US and Europe 
during the 2008–09 recession.  If Singapore's 
recovery was due to a pickup in GDP of its 
trading partners, the AD schedule would shift 
right along a given AS schedule.  In fact, the rapid 
recovery of export demand occurred despite the 
slow recovery of the trading partners’ GDP.  This 
suggests that the boost in export demand  
came from the increase in international 
competitiveness brought about by the wage 
subsidies, which lowered ULC, especially in 
manufacturing.  As a result, it was the AS 
schedule that shifted right along a given AD 
schedule. 
 
Chart 1 
Singapore’s International Competitiveness 
1996–2013 
 
 
             Source: DOS, IMF 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10
  The index is set to 100 in 1996.  The index was 105.8 in 2008, 105.7 in 2009 and 108.9 in 2010. 
 
11
  The index is set to 100 in 2012.  See Table 19.5 of DOS (2014). 
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Sum-up 
While the adoption of an exchange rate-based 
policy rule by the MAS since 1981 describes very 
well the actual conduct of monetary policy and 
has delivered reduced volatility in inflation and 
output, a look at how the Singapore government 
responded to the major recessionary shocks 
suggests that more than one policy tool was used. 
In response to the negative shocks confronting 
the economy in 1985–86, 1997–98 and 2008–09, 
a major programme of wage subsidies—taking 
the form of a major cut in employers’ CPF  
 
 contribution rates in the first two episodes and a 
jobs credit funded by the government in the third 
episode—accompanied some adjustment of the 
exchange rate.  In this Special Feature, we have 
examined the theoretical channels through which 
a wage subsidy scheme works to fight a recession. 
We also took a preliminary look at some data 
based on the Singapore experience.  A more 
formal modelling of how the wage subsidy 
scheme works along with an exchange rate-based 
policy rule remains an item for future research. 
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